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In this paper, the authors debunk a long-held myth that generalisation is 
primarily the domain of quantitative research. Based on a review of modern 
and historical approaches to generalisation, they argue that generalisation 
from qualitative research (GQR) can be achieved, not through a process of self-
justification, but through defensible and rigorous research design and methods. 
The authors go on to consider examples from their own qualitative research 
work spanning the last 20 years. From these examples they offer mechanisms 
that qualitative researchers can employ to generalise from their findings. They 
suggest that generalisation is achieved through a process of generalisation 
cycles (GCs) which produce normative truth statements (NTSs), which in turn 
can be contested or confirmed with theory and empirical evidence. Keywords: 
Generalising from Qualitative Research, Generalisation, Qualitative Research, 
Normative Truth Statements, Evidence and Theory 
  
 
In this paper, the authors intend to debunk a long-held myth that generalisation is 
primarily the domain of quantitative research. We argue that yes, one can generalise 
legitimately from qualitative research (Guenther & Falk, 2019). Not only is generalisation 
possible, it is at least as legitimate and useful as generalisation from quantitative research 
(GQR), given the conditions we here identify regarding the process and nature of 
generalisation. In a 2007 conference paper (Falk & Guenther, 2007) and a more recent chapter 
(Guenther & Falk, 2019), we consolidate our rejection of the “discourse of self-justification” 
that surrounded the qualitative research literature in “modern” times (approximately from the 
1970s – see literature review later for precise context of modern). In the latter literature, as late 
as 1985, Lincoln and Guba (1985, p. 110) claimed that “The only generalization is: there is no 
generalization.”  
It could be argued that the discourse of self-justification was a necessary step on the 
way in the “legitimisation” process of qualitative research, but, as we counter-argue here, there 
were other ways derivable from the history and philosophy of science pre-dating “modern” 
qualitative research. From the “old” history, we revisit the move away from the consolidation 
of rejection of the post 1970s self-justification. Then we bring the old and the new together 
through an historical overview that sets the development of notions of generaliseability in an 
approximate 2,000+ year timeframe. These ways are still available to us now, as qualitative 
researchers, and thus we suggest an alternative means for researchers to structure and justify 
their work regarding generaliseability. 
Bridges (2017, Chapter 12) provides us with the clue to link old and new approaches 
through his and others’ ideas of “truth claims” (see for example Ellis et al., 2014, p. 735; 
Margolis, 2004, p. 614) and propositions. We recast these claims as “Normative Truth 
Statements” (NTSs) and so we develop a spiral model of developmental generalisation which 
is relevant to qualitative OR quantitative research, both stemming as they do from the same 
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history of science. We conclude in general terms that creating new knowledge is an iterative 
process, where truth statements are contested and confirmed drawing on evidence and theory. 
While developing new knowledge based on the known literature is not a new concept, what is 
new is applying this to generalisation. However, our new understanding of generalisation 
should not be read as an excuse for poor methodology. To the contrary. Our spiral model should 
strengthen the conceptual base of qualitative methodology and promote a strong 
methodological basis from which to justify generalisability from research results, from the 
bounds articulated in the methodology itself. Nor do we expect generalisable truth to emerge 
from every piece of qualitative research. However, we do show that truths emerging about the 
particular are often just as valid and useful as those that lead to the general.  
To help make the ensuing discussion more tangible, informing policy is one example 
of the application of GQR. Intentionally or unintentionally, informing policy has been a major 
outcome of qualitative research, though often challenged as having too small a sample, or not 
being statistically valid. Policy personnel use case study outcomes (for example) as evidence 
to justify, adjust or terminate strategies and initiatives. In the new old GQR, we provide a 
structured and reasoned method of designing qualitative research to maximise the 
generalisability, or of retrospectively analysing whether or how it might be possible and 
legitimate. In much policy-oriented research, design for generalisability will be crucial when 
normative claims or theories are required to explain why policies, practices and systems work 
the way they do (or not). 
 
Our Positionality 
 
Our interest in GQR arises from more than 20 years of qualitative research work in a 
variety of contexts across Australia and Indonesia. Many of the issues we have researched (for 
example in education and training, biosecurity, domestic violence, justice, and child protection) 
have generated findings which could have been taken up powerfully to effect changes in 
government policies and their implementation. We have also been frustrated by the lack of 
useful quantitative research on these issues (sometimes on the basis of poor data quality, 
insufficient data, or an inability to untangle the complex causal logics from the multiple factors 
that produce outcomes). This is particularly true for program evaluations that we have 
conducted. Where quantitative research has failed to explain how and why observable changes 
occur, our work has often powerfully unpacked the theoretical and philosophical bases for 
changes we observe through research and evaluation. For many policy advisors this at times 
creates “light bulb” moments of understanding but fails to translate into changed policy because 
the findings are “just” qualitative. We believe that a new language and discourse associated 
with qualitative research will help shape changes that will see GQR more widely accepted. 
 
Consolidating a New Era in GQR 
 
To summarise the basis for the new old approach to GQR, we draw on Guenther and 
Falk (2019). More than a decade on from our earlier work noted in the Introduction, we looked 
in the literature for anything new that might suggest we should update our initial assumptions, 
building on subsequent research. If it turned out that our new approach is justified, we felt it 
would more likely provide stronger support for generalisability applications for qualitative 
research, in areas of policy development and implementation, practice improvement and 
program evaluation. We did indeed find more, and so were tempted to conclude that the debate 
was over, and it was not worth pursuing this topic further. Moreover, literature such as 
Eisenhart (2009), Chenail (2010), Briesch, Swaminathan, Welsh, and Chafouleas (2014), 
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Tsang (2014), and Patton (2015) provided some different schemas for viewing the issue of 
generalising from qualitative research, lending it an additional air of respectability.  
However, as we tried to make sense of the intervening literature, we found that most or 
all were based on an assumed “growth” or refinement of the ideas around generalisation from 
qualitative research (GQR) post-1970s. Importantly, there was nothing new in the sense that 
they were re-shuffling the deck chairs on the Titanic, as it were, assuming GQR was something 
that had only emerged from the relatively recent establishment of qualitative research as a 
“valid” field of Inquiry. This establishment itself formed part of a set of literature embedded in 
it what we called and still refer to a “discourse of self-justification.” In other words, the work 
from 2007 onwards was still justifying GQR against its quantitative cousin/s.  
We recall that all qualitative methodological theses and research studies from around 
the 1970s onwards (including Master’s and PhD theses) included sections specifically referring 
to the incapacity to generalise from qualitative research compared with the predecessors of 
“valid” research typified in “hard sciences.” Lincoln and Guba’s (1985, p. 110) statement that 
“The only generalization is: there is no generalization” was perhaps the most quoted of the 
literature cited in such research. The Lincoln and Guba quote stands as a clear example of a 
direct acquiescence that this discourse of self-justification was an established entity. Any 
claims to the contrary would have to be, by definition, part of a discourse of self-justification. 
So GQR, in terms of the newly established acceptance of qualitative methods in general, would 
perforce be a claim that, while we have so far believed we cannot generalise from qualitative 
research, we can and in fact do. For us this was our 2007 stance. In light of the consolidation 
of that stance in the literature 2007 to the present, the authors could have been tempted to agree 
that the issue had been resolved. However, that very “acceptance” – or perhaps acquiescence - 
that GQR was only a recent phenomenon created a disjuncture in what was known and done 
by scientists and philosophers up to the so-called “modern” times. Hence our determination to 
take a fresh look at the bases of GQR. 
Before progressing, we offer a simple definition of generalisability. According to Vogt 
(2005, p. 131), generalisability is “The extent to which you can come to conclusions about one 
thing (often, a *population) based on information about another (often, a ∗sample).” The 
simplicity of this definition disguises a contested understanding among research 
methodologies, which tend to split along binarised qualitative/quantitative lines. For example, 
Miller and Brewer (2003) define quantitative generalisation as “a process of first establishing 
the empirical reliability of facts and then using these facts to assess the validity of theory” (p. 
127) and then under the heading of qualitative generalisation suggest: “Generalisation in 
qualitative research can be viewed as reversing this balance” (p. 127), suggesting that there is 
only one “generalisation” and that pesky qualitative research lot think they can upset that status 
quo. Which indeed they have done. From here, it is possible to open up a Pandora’s Box of 
caveats, conditions and contexts that frame and delimit the definitions. Dahler-Larson (2018, 
Kindle Location 30351) argues that “Issues of causality and generalization are important, but 
their meaning is not legislated by the philosophy of science. Instead, their meanings flow out 
of debate, argument, institutionalized rules, and power.” 
 
Basis for a New Look 
 
Reviewing the argument of the paper so far and filling some of the gaps, the last five 
decades have seen emerging commentaries, if not debates, about how qualitative researchers 
might indeed generalise from their findings. As already observed, there was an overall 
“discourse of self-justification” which required the mandatory disclaimer as to generalisability, 
as noted above. One strand of commentary within the research pertaining to the discourse of 
self-justification was a growing observation that generalisation was happening whether it 
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“should” or not. Robert Stake (1980) recognised early that generalisation occurred and 
externalised the phenomenon by attributing generalisation to the actions of end-users or 
observers. It is they who do it, not us, the researchers, who warn against GQR.  
In the overarching discourse of self-justification, ten years before Lincoln and Guba 
(1985), Cronbach (1975, p. 124) concluded that social phenomena were too context-specific to 
permit generalisability. He suggested the priority of qualitative research was to “appraise a 
practice or proposition… in context.” Denzin (1983, p. 133) also rejected generalisability as a 
goal. Others emphasised the context-specificity of qualitative research (Wainwright, 1997), 
which in their view limited generalisation to other similar situations (Creswell, 1998). 
Hammersley (1990, p. 108) argued that ethnographers are generally “not very effective in 
establishing the typicality of what they report. And in the absence of such information we must 
often suspend judgement about the generalisability of their claims.” 
So these discourses of self-justification, emerging from the need for consolidation and 
justification of qualitative research, were paralleled by a commentary about the uses or 
functionality of qualitative research. That is, end-users, readers, commissioners of research and 
researchers themselves did to varying degrees generalise from qualitative research, as Stake 
noted. In other words, regardless of the debates, qualitative research has often been used either 
by researchers themselves or by end users to make generalised conclusions. The Stake position, 
however, begs the question as to why do end users feel they can generalise? What is it about 
the research that gives them the wish or confidence to do so? 
There followed a set of literature which recognised the commentary on generalisability 
as a phenomenon, analysing and synthesising it. Patton (2015, p. 718), for example, 
summarises 12 approaches to qualitative generalisation depending on different inquiry 
perspectives. Eisenhart (2009) makes similar claims, identifying five main types of qualitative 
generalisation: theoretical, probabilistic, nomological, grounded and syntheses/meta-analysis. 
Lewis, Ritchie, Ormston, and Morrell (2013) argue for just three approaches: representational, 
inferential and theoretical generalisation. The first refers to inferences that can be made from 
the child to parent population samples; the second from the sample to another population; and 
the third where inferences can be taken from data towards theoretical propositions. Chenail 
(2010) offers a similar set of “generalizability strategies” based on theory and cross-case 
generalisation based on meta-studies. Tsang (2014), in an examination of generalisation from 
25 case studies between 2008 and 2012, shows three types: theoretical, empirical and 
falsification. He concludes that “For cross-population generalization, there is simply no reason 
why case study results should be inherently less generalizable” compared with/to quantitative 
methods (p. 379). On a more practical level, Larsson (2009) identifies five ways that qualitative 
research can be employed for generalisation. The first two are used to falsify generalisation: 
(1) The ideographic study, where the intent is to focus on individual difference rather than 
common truths; (2) Studies that undermine established universal “truths”; where the focus is 
on creating doubt about predetermined truth. The next three can be useful when generalisation 
is called for: (3) Enhancing generalisation potential by maximising variation, where sampling 
is used to deliberately increase the probability of variance; (4) Generalisation through context 
similarity such that the weight of evidence allows generalised judgments to be made; and (5) 
Generalisation through recognition of patterns. 
Wilder (2014) offers another approach, drawing on quantitative meta-analyses to 
conduct a qualitative meta-synthesis to determine the generalisable effects of parental 
engagement on student academic achievement. Meta-synthesis can also be applied to 
qualitative studies. Systematic reviews are yet another way that qualitative and quantitative 
studies can be assessed for generalising purposes. Of particular relevance to the purpose of this 
paper, Wilder notes that “…qualitative and quantitative research syntheses can effectively 
match existing research to the requirements of policy-makers and practitioners…” (p. 378). 
1016   The Qualitative Report 2019 
Gough, Oliver, and Thomas (2017) point to heterogeneity in studies for systematic reviews. 
They argue that: “If an intervention is effective over many different applications in different 
contexts with different populations then it maybe provides a more generalisable and more 
robust test of effectiveness.” (p. 67). Petticrew and Roberts (2006) concur: 
 
Reviewing the results of a number of studies of course itself provides a test of 
generalizability; if the results have been replicated in several settings with 
different populations, then this gives an indication of whether the results are 
transferable. (p. 149) 
 
With all these well-justified approaches, does that mean that the debates are all but over? Well, 
maybe. But before closing that door we decided to implement a little evidence-based 
revisionism and see what would happen to current thinking if we set the more recent work on 
GQR in a longer and broader historical and disciplinary context, though we have tried to be 
selective about this length and breadth for manageability reasons. A more extensive explication 
can be found in Guenther and Falk (2019). 
 
Stepping Back 
 
Given the context established above, one of “modern” post 1970s justification of 
qualitative research and its accompanying discourse of self-justification, we thought a look 
before the modern times might be instructive. In the published history of philosophy and 
science, debates about generalisability are not new. However, academic debates around the 
topic differ from practical manifestations of generalisability. Some ageless examples are self-
evident (and rather trite). For example, if a child finds she gets burnt on a hot object, she will 
soon generalise her instance/s of experience to a workable theory about touching a hot object 
and learn to avoid doing so in the future from quite a limited number of instances. Trauma 
theory as a discipline is based on the assumption of the strong and long-lasting generalisability 
of a small number of impacting events: “Repeatedly experiencing similar types of events 
fosters a generalization of their memory representation” (Elbert, Schauer, & Neuner,  2015, p. 
230). The individual’s capacity to generalise from even a single instance to all future activity 
is important to survival. To attempt and phrase such generalisability in quantitative terms ends 
up being non-sensical: “This experiment will require N people to apply their hands to a red-hot 
surface to determine what the probability is that they will burn their hands if they repeat the act 
in the future.” 
So the practice of generalising is one important consideration. Theory is inextricably 
linked to practice in the sense that we quickly form a theory about future likelihood of the same 
outcomes from limited numbers. Theory further arises when we start meta-wondering via the 
established cognitive discourses of various disciplines about the process and conditions under 
which generalisability can be reasonably expected to occur when the instance is not so clear-
cut as the hand and hot object example above. The disciplines of philosophy have a way of 
explaining generalisability, as do those of physics, statistics, geometry and others. To 
emphasise the point made above, the act of generalising has two components: the practice (hand 
on hot surface) and the theory derived from that practice (If I do that again, likely I’ll get hurt 
again and it’s not worth the risk). We will return to the role of theory and observation later. 
As seen above, the making sense of particular instances of information by bundling 
them into more general ideas about their reliable application to potential but as-yet-
unexperienced events, is as old as humankind. The earliest of written records such as those of 
the Greek philosophers “…stressed the role of general concepts in knowledge” (Woleński, 
2004, p. 6). And this leads us onto the next section, which overviews the writings about 
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generalisation before the emergence of the push for recognition of “modern” qualitative 
research following Taylor, Bogdan, and DeVault, (2016): 
 
...early qualitative researchers, some of whom conducted their research in an era 
when their preferred approach was in disfavor. … We also have learned from 
the epistemological and theoretical challenges to traditional (p. xi) ethnography 
and qualitative methodology raised by researchers since the 1970s. (xii) 
 
So “modern” is from the 1970s roughly, while the publication of Denzin and Lincoln’s (1994) 
Handbook of Qualitative Research marks a point in this modern history of qualitative research 
when this establishment occurred – in Taylor’s terms, when the era of “disfavoured” research 
methodology had largely passed. 
But the elephant in the room remains: How is it that GQR emerged as an issue from 
this “modern” era of establishing qualitative research, and largely avoided pinning the issue 
into the earlier historical views of generalisation that were extant at the time the “hard sciences” 
were consolidating and changing their methodologies around generalisation? What are the 
implications of this historical sequence? And so to the next section. 
 
Broad Historical Context 
 
Here we draw on the work of six key figures from history to point to the historical 
development of generalising processes. We step back more than two millennia to the work of 
Aristotle and move forward in time to the work of Carnap in the last century. 
To understand the debates about generalisability from qualitative research requires an 
understanding of the history of the philosophy of science. For this purpose we could go back 
in time to Aristotle (384-322 BCE), who built his work on a “two-dimensional framework” 
(Psillos, 2012) of observable phenomena and a priori knowledge or principles, which should 
be mutually supportive. 
Nearly two millennia later, Bacon (1561-1626) disputed Aristotle’s method arguing for 
the development of first principles from observation. Bacon, “in his view of science, found 
almost no place for mathematics” and claimed “that an essential part of interpreting nature by 
the new method of induction consists in devising a crucial experiment that judges between two 
competing hypotheses for the causes of an effect” (Psillos, 2006, p. 508). 
Newton (1642–1727), a scientist of his time who is perhaps most famous for his 
articulation of the laws of gravity, created four rules of reasoning. These rules developed in the 
early 1700s applied to drawing conclusions in “natural philosophy.” 
 
Rule I: We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both 
true and sufficient to explain their appearances. 
Rule II: Therefore to the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign 
the same causes.  
Rule III: The qualities of bodies, which admit neither intensification nor 
remission of degrees, and which are found to belong to all bodies within the 
reach of our experiments, are to be esteemed the universal qualities of bodies 
whatsoever.  
Rule IV: In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions inferred 
by general induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true, 
notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined, till such time 
as other phenomena occur, by which they may either be made more 
accurate, or liable to exceptions. (Gower, 1997, pp. 69-70) 
1018   The Qualitative Report 2019 
 
The first two rules relate to deductive logic applied to assigning causes. In effect, he is saying 
we cannot assign a cause if there is no observable effect and vice versa. The third, which was 
constrained by objects with universal qualities is a kind of inductive logic, but with very limited 
scope. You can induce to the universal if you know that all objects you are measuring have the 
same properties. Gravity is a good example of this. The fourth is more open and argues for 
induction from the phenomenon to the hypothesis, as long as nothing observed contradicts the 
hypothesis. Moreover, Rule 4 lays the basis in principle for our later proposition about 
spiralling increasingly “true” Normative Truth Statements which build iteratively in cycles 
with new evidence and theory testing (See discussion of Bridges, 2017 later). The latter rules 
caused some division among natural philosophers who felt that deductive logic alone could be 
used to make generalisations. 
Linnaeus’ (1707-1788) work provides another example of observation being used to 
create a normative botanical classification system. Prior to Linnaeus the botanical classification 
system as we know it today did not exist. He attempted to create order from observations in 
diversity. Of significance to our discussion is that he used empirical qualitative evidence to 
generalise: Müller-Wille and Charmantier (2012) conclude: “Not all of the generalisations that 
Linnaeus put forward… would be verified—in fact, almost all his attempts to identify domestic 
substitutes or acclimatize exotics were doomed to fail” (p. 14). Importantly, Linnaeus’ ability 
to generalise was not dependent on having all the data required to draw a universal conclusion. 
Darwin (1809-1882) in 1833 embarked, as a natural scientist, on a global expedition of 
five years, spending a long time on the islands of Oceania and South America. He recorded his 
observations and reflection in his research journals, which he diffused in the book On the 
Origin of the Species by Means of Natural Selection (1859). Whether Darwin used deductive 
logic to generalise and so develop a theory of evolution—or whether it was more inductive—
has been a point of contestation for some time (see for example Caplan, 1979). The reality is 
probably not an either (deductive) or (inductive) answer, but a creative combination of both 
that allows for generalisation from inductive and deductive processes. 
One hundred years on from Darwin, natural philosopher Carnap (May 18, 1891 – 
September 14, 1970) proposed that, consistent with Newton’s Rule IV, the greater the number 
of confirmations for the premises of an argument the greater the probability generalisation 
could be applied inductively. Carnap believed that, “just as logical implication is the key 
concept for deductive logic, so degree of confirmation is the key concept for inductive logic” 
(Gower, 1997, p. 215). Similarly, probability associated with variability underpins the 
assumptions of Generalisability Theory which is used to assess the dependability of 
measurements associated with quantitative empirical studies (Briesch et al., 2014). 
The point is, that even the best quantitative studies suffer from limitations, and that in 
both qualitative and quantitative studies there is no such thing as certainty in generalisability. 
Comparing generalisation from qualitative and quantitative research, Polit and Beck (2010) 
argue that the ideal of statistical generalisation in science is nothing more than a “myth” (p. 
1452) as is the notion of “random sampling” (p. 2453). Bringing these historical and academic 
arguments together, we could feel some confidence in generalising from qualitative research, 
with similar caveats which might be applied to quantitative research methods. 
 
Why GQR Is Possible 
 
The argument for the approaches and processes or mechanisms of qualitative 
generalisation are now well established. However, understanding why generalisability is 
possible is seldom unpacked beyond a mechanistic logic which in part is internally driven. For 
example, within a constructivist paradigm terms like credibility, transferability, dependability, 
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and confirmability replace the usual positivist criteria of internal and external validity, 
reliability, and objectivity” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2018, Location 995). What we can conclude 
from this redefinition of terms is that generalisability in positivist or post-positivist paradigms 
(associated with quantitative methods) is not the same thing as generalisability in constructivist 
or interpretivist paradigms (associated with qualitative methods). Further, the difference in 
terminology should not imply that one form of generalisation is better than another. Again, are 
we off the hook as it were? Is there further need to explore the topic? 
A clue as to why there might be a need to unpack the concept of generalisability 
emerges in Patton’s follow-up to principles of generalisation mentioned above. He introduces 
the topic of “truth” (Patton, 2015, p. 727) deferring to Thomas Schwandt’s entry in the 
Dictionary of Qualitative Inquiry (Schwandt, 2007) where 10 definitions are briefly explained. 
Truth is the concern of philosophy, within the field of epistemology. Truth theories cut across 
the methodological paradigms and help explain why and on what basis normative statements 
or generalisations can be made (Bridges, 2017; Ellis et al., 2014; Lehrer, 1990; Margolis, 
2004). The Fourth Rule of Newton confirms the manner in which they are refined, wherein 
“…we are to look upon propositions inferred by general induction from phenomena as 
accurately or very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined, 
till such time as other phenomena occur, by which they may either be made more accurate, or 
liable to exceptions” (Gower, 1997, pp. 69-70). 
Knowledge (for our purposes of generalisation), according to Lehrer (1990) has three 
conditions: it must be true; it must be accepted (or believed); and it must be completely 
justified. In the context of knowledge for research, evidence enables justification, and 
consistent with the definition offered by Denzin and Lincoln above, the credibility of research 
makes it believable. But a question remains about what truth is. The answer to this helps us 
understand why and how we can apply qualitative or quantitative research to the task of 
normative generalisation. 
Truth theories fall into five main categories: (1) Truth as Correspondence; (2) Truth as 
coherence; (3) Truth as what works; (4) Truth as consensus and (5) Truth as warranted beliefs 
(Bridges, 2017, pp. 185-212). There are variations of these five categorisations (see for 
example David, 2004). However, in simple terms, these theories suggest one of the following 
five positions: 
 
1) A proposition is true only if it corresponds with an actual state of affairs or 
condition (Bridges, 2017, p. 191); 
2) Propositional statements are true if they represent a coherent, consistent and 
comprehensive set of propositions (Bridges, 2017, p. 192); 
3) A proposition is true if and only if it works allowing you to pursue your 
project/interest/purposes in practice (Bridges, 2017, p. 194); 
4) A proposition is true if there is agreement universally or among relevant 
populations (Bridges, 2017, p. 195); and 
5) Propositions are true if they satisfy the relevant tests of truth for propositions 
of their kind; they are rationally warranted, reasonable or defensible 
(Bridges, 2017, p. 197). 
 
In his next chapter, Bridges goes on to draw connections between educational research 
paradigms and the theoretical positions listed above. For example, he links the pragmatist 
paradigm with “what works” theories of truth. While he does not make assertions about other 
truth theories it is not hard to see a link between correspondence and positivism/post 
positivism; or coherence and constructivist paradigms; or consensus and participatory 
paradigms. Beyond the epistemological position of these theories, if we take account of 
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ontologies and axiologies, the “paradigmatic controversies” (Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba, 2011) 
are little more than alignments to truth theories. Hence, we can generalise from qualitative 
research, not on the basis of methodology but on the basis of epistemological, ontological and 
axiological foundations of truth. 
 
Merging of Qualitative and Quantitative Research 
 
It has always intrigued us that “hard science” contains a large amount of qualitative 
research. While scientists devise a hypothesis, then they often engage in something called 
“proof of concept” which is a minor study, often qualitative, conducted to establish the need or 
veracity of the hypothesis they started with. In other words, somehow or other qualitative 
methods are used to validate a quantitative concept but are not given legitimacy as “qualitative 
research”: they have been justified only in terms of proving a quantitative/scientific 
concept/hypothesis. So that makes it acceptable. It would be more accurate if the preliminary 
study was recognised as a qualitative study at the outset. A hypothesis, after all, is simply a 
statement of a tentative conjecture about the likelihood of something being true or not, once 
tested. Such “proof of concept” of an hypothesis or research question is needed because in itself 
it provides more substantive “proof” that the hypothesis is worth exploring. Qualitative and 
quantitative research merges whatever the research is called. In an attempt to justify “truth 
claims” of the social sciences Margolis (2004) ultimately concludes that there is “no principled 
disjunction between the natural and human sciences: the physical sciences are themselves 
reasonably characterized as abstractions made within an encompassing inquiry of ‘self-
understanding’” (p. 616). However, the goal of all research is to find more of the truth of 
something. But what is “truth,” and how do we know when we “find” it? We have previously 
concluded that generalisation is a process rather than an outcome, shown below in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The cycle of generalisation from qualitative research (Source: Guenther & Falk, 2019). 
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The generalisation process, which we have diagrammatised in Error! Reference 
source not found., is iterative allowing for both contestation and confirmation. The qualitative 
data collected as “empirical evidence” may support the development of new theory or additions 
to existing theories. Similarly, as theories emerge, they can be tested with new data. With each 
confirmation in the generalisation process, the probability that the knowledge gained, can be 
applied more generally, should increase. Where contestation occurs new processes of 
generalisation occur, which in turn lead to normative truth statements—at least for a time. 
For the researcher, the starting point may not be at the bottom of the spiral. It is possible 
that new research builds on existing normative truth statements, existing theories and existing 
evidence. 
 
Examples of GQR 
 
In Guenther and Falk (2019) two case studies were cited in detail and these formed the 
basis for the new look at GQR, building on three previous cases discussed in Falk and Guenther 
(2007). In this paper, we do not repeat those cases, but refer the interested reader to them for 
information on the steps in the argument towards a new old GQR. With those case studies as a 
back-drop, we now turn to a more comprehensive overview of historical examples from the 
authors’ work showing how GQR has occurred in a variety of research contexts. Error! 
Reference source not found. provides a selection of published research where generalisation 
has occurred from quantitative findings. The table starts with projects going back 20 years and 
leads to more recent work. 
While it might not be immediately evident from the table, it is important to note that 
these research projects are not isolated or discrete pieces of work. Explicit links between 
projects are shown in the second column. It should be noted though that the links extend to 
other work by the authors not cited here and prior theoretical and empirical qualitative research 
work conducted by others. The methodologies employed use a variety of research and 
evaluation methods. Empirical evidence plays a role in each study, mostly in the form of 
qualitative interviews and/or focus groups. The second-last column shows that the 
generalisations emerging from the studies are mostly theoretical yielding principles and models 
with a mixture of practice, strategic and policy implications. The selection of normative truth 
statements given in the last column are expressions of the generalisability of the qualitative 
findings. 
On the pages following, we attempt to diagrammatise the information from Table 1 in 
Error! Reference source not found. (below), showing four different contexts for the 13 
research projects, and the progressive cycles of generalisation from one project to the next 
(arrowed lines). In addition, we show the cross-project informing links (dashed lines). 
 
Table 1. Examples of GQR in various contexts. 
Project Builds 
on 
Citations Methodology 
employed 
Context of 
generalisations 
Type of 
generalisation 
Normative 
truth 
statement 
examples 
1  (Falk & 
Harrison, 
1998, 2000; 
Falk & 
Kilpatrick, 
2000) 
3 Case studies Community 
interactions and 
social capital 
Theory of 
learning and 
social capital 
Networks, trust 
and reciprocity 
underpin 
community-
based learning 
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Project Builds 
on 
Citations Methodology 
employed 
Context of 
generalisations 
Type of 
generalisation 
Normative 
truth 
statement 
examples 
2 1 (Centre for 
Research 
and 
Learning in 
Regional 
Australia, 
2001) 
10 Case 
studies, 700 
interviews 
Delivery of 
vocational 
education and 
training in 
regional 
communities 
Synthesis of 
findings, 
leading to 
principles of 
practice 
Social capital 
underpins the 
effective 
delivery of 
vocational 
education and 
training in 
regional 
communities 
3  (Northern 
Territory 
Council of 
Social 
Service, 
2004) 
Mixed 
methods, 
reliant on 70 
interviews 
Employment 
disadvantaged 
groups 
Theory as 
“practice 
principles” for 
strategic 
interventions 
Integrated and 
inclusive 
service and 
policy 
coordination 
underpin better 
employment 
outcomes 
4 3 (Falk, 
Guenther, 
Lambert, & 
Johnstone, 
2006) 
Formative 
action 
evaluation, 42 
interviews, 
purposeful and 
representative 
sampling 
Domestic 
violence 
policies and 
programs 
Application of 
theory to 
policy 
development, 
drawing on 
empirical data 
Interconnection 
of knowledge 
and identity 
affects network 
functionality 
and policy 
effectiveness 
5  (Young & 
Guenther, 
2008; 
Young, 
Guenther,& 
Boyle, 
2007) 
Mixed 
methods, 
informed by 
four case 
studies 
Vocational 
learning in 
remote 
communities 
Theory for 
models of 
service 
delivery 
Access to 
effective 
training is 
constrained by 
regulated 
training 
systems which 
fail to consider 
local 
aspirations for 
learning  
6 3 (Guenther, 
Falk, & 
Arnott, 
2008) 
6 intervention 
cases, 84 
respondents, 
mixed methods 
Employment 
and training for 
welfare 
dependent 
groups 
Theory 
development as 
implications 
for policy and 
its 
implementation 
Foundation 
employability 
skills which 
build 
confidence, 
motivation and 
identity 
support welfare 
to work 
transitions 
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Project Builds 
on 
Citations Methodology 
employed 
Context of 
generalisations 
Type of 
generalisation 
Normative 
truth 
statement 
examples 
7 4 (Arnott, 
Guenther, 
& 
Williams, 
2009) 
10 evaluative 
case studies, 
85 interviews 
Domestic 
violence 
strategies 
Synthesis from 
qualitative data 
for 
development of 
criteria for 
sustainable 
development 
Effective 
domestic 
violence 
interventions 
are 
underpinned by 
local 
commitment. 
8 2, 4 (Balatti, 
Black, & 
Falk, 2009) 
3 Action 
research case 
studies 
Partnerships in 
literacy and 
numeracy 
programs 
Theory for 
principles, 
application to 
policy 
effectiveness 
Stronger 
partnerships 
lead to 
increased 
social capital 
and improves 
policy 
outcomes 
9 1, 2, 8 (Falk & 
Surata, 
2011) 
Macro-analytic 
theory building 
supplemented 
by 3 case 
studies 
Social 
interactions for 
learning 
Theory for 
policy and 
strategy 
Social 
interactions are 
the mechanism 
of human 
behaviour 
change, whose 
effectiveness is 
dependent on 
the 
configuration 
of interactions 
for the 
particular 
purpose in 
different 
contexts 
10 1, 2, 
8, 9 
(Falk & 
Surata, 
2011) 
Multi-site, 
multi-issue, 
multi-
methodologies 
Strategies and 
policies for 
managing 
biosecurity 
nationally in 
Indonesia 
Analysis and 
synthesis of 
findings, 
leading to 
principles of 
strategy and 
policy 
development 
Clearly defined 
purposeful 
participatory 
linking 
interactions 
produce 
strategies and 
policies that 
are effective in 
tailoring 
“science” for 
local 
conditions, 
using local 
knowledge as 
the effective 
modifier. 
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Project Builds 
on 
Citations Methodology 
employed 
Context of 
generalisations 
Type of 
generalisation 
Normative 
truth 
statement 
examples 
11 5, 6 (Guenther, 
Disbray, & 
Osborne, 
2014; 
Guenther & 
McRae-
Williams, 
2014, 2016; 
McRae-
Williams, 
2014; 
McRae-
Williams & 
Guenther, 
2016) 
Two major 
Grounded 
Theory 
qualitative 
projects on 
education and 
training, >100 
interviews and 
focus groups, 
multiple case 
studies 
Remote 
education and 
training for 
Indigenous 
learners 
Theory 
building, 
principles for 
practice and 
policy, 
falsification 
Coercive 
policies and 
strategies fail 
to improve 
education and 
training 
outcomes. 
Successful 
education is 
redefined in 
terms of 
community 
aspirations and 
alignment to 
philosophical 
standpoints. 
12 1, 2, 
8, 9, 
10 
(Falk, 2017) Multi-site, 
multi-issue, 
multi-
methodologies; 
Four empirical 
case studies 
with additional 
national 
(Indonesian) 
validation 
processes 
Building a 
knowledge 
base to support 
a national 
biosecurity 
body 
Analysis and 
synthesis of 
findings, 
leading to a 
sound 
knowledge 
base to support 
national 
biosecurity 
policy 
development 
and 
coordination 
Analysis and 
synthesis of 
targeted 
empirical 
research 
studies 
supplemented 
by national 
validation 
processes 
provides a 
strong 
evidence base 
for national 
policy 
formulation 
and 
implementation 
13 5, 9, 
11 
(Guenther et 
al., 2017) 
5 Case studies, 
69 interviews 
Remote 
Indigenous 
adult learning 
Falsification 
and theory 
building as 
principles for 
policy and 
practice 
Human capital 
theory fails to 
explain 
training and 
employment 
uptake in 
remote 
communities. 
Local 
ownership 
enhances 
training and 
employability. 
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Figure 2. Cycles of GQR (based on Table 1 examples, highlighting key issues address in NTSs 
for each cycle). 
 
A few features stand out from this presentation of our work over 20 years as depicted 
in Table 1 and the schematic representation in Figure 2 above. The diagram uses the numbers 
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1 to 13 shown in the table to represent the different projects. Firstly, despite the diversity of 
studies, grouped by four different qualitative research contexts or fields of study, there is 
considerable cross-field application from the NTS issues presented (represented by the dashed 
lines connecting projects from the different fields of study). Learnings from the community 
development Generalisation Cycles (GCs) contribute directly to the Employment disadvantage 
GCs (Projects 1 to 6) and indirectly to the Remote education and training GCs (Projects 9 to 
11 and 13). Similarly, the learnings from the Domestic violence policy and strategy GCs inform 
the Remote education and training GCs (Projects 7 to 11). There are strong connections 
between social capital, identity resources and local aspirations (Projects 1, 6 and 11). We also 
see connections between social interactions, local commitment and local ownership (Projects 
9 to 13). Likewise, there are important connections between service integration and network 
functionality (Projects 3 to 4). 
Secondly, over the longer term—particularly noticeable in nearly 20 years of work in 
the community development GCs—there is iterative refinement and development of theory and 
its application (From Project 1 to 2, and 8, 9, 10 and 12). Note how the NTSs for this series of 
cycles shifts from the initial theory, to its application for training delivery, through to its 
application for policy outcomes, and for further policy development and policy knowledge 
exchange.  
Thirdly, over the longer term—particularly noticeable in the more than 10 years of work 
in the Remote education and training GCs—there are examples of falsification, where 
empirical evidence challenges the assumption of theoretical assumptions (in this case Human 
Capital Theory, Project 11) and accepted policy imperatives (in this case coercive strategies, 
Project 13). 
These all are manifestations of the process of contestation/conformation and 
theory/evidence building, shown earlier in Error! Reference source not found.. It is also 
important to note that each GC is built on a pre-existing evidence base and a theoretical 
foundation - more or less according to Newton’s Rule IV discussed earlier - as shown at the 
bottom the diagram. Another point to note is that the locus of the projects changes over time. 
For some studies, the research or evaluation is bound to an organisational context (for example, 
government and non-government organisations), a systemic context (for example training 
systems), a policy context (for example family and domestic violence) or a specific community 
context (for example rural communities). Geographically, the studies are attached to diverse 
locations—in all states and territories of Australia, and in selected parts of Indonesia. However, 
the generalisations we make from each of the cycles are not from sample to population, or from 
one region to another. Rather we apply our NTSs to systemic structures, networks, policies, 
principles, philosophies and theories. We now turn to the mechanisms for these generalisations 
from qualitative research. 
 
Mechanisms for GQR 
 
The NTSs outlined in Error! Reference source not found. do not emerge from thin 
air. On reflection we use mechanisms that have a basis in the historical development of 
generalisation (for example Newton’s Rule IV), on an understanding of methodology, and an 
understanding of epistemological truth. In this section we offer five mechanisms through which 
we have made GQRs. 
 
Research design 
 
Not all research designs are suited to GQR. Some are focused on the particular rather 
than the general. The difference lies in design. Qualitative research designed for generalisation 
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will probably have an existing theoretical basis. This was certainly the case for the early studies 
(1 and 2) listed in Error! Reference source not found.. Large sample size is not a pre-
condition for GQR—as we (and others) have shown it is possible to falsify a NTS with a single 
case—Project 13 demonstrated this in each of five cases, each with no more than 15 
participants. That said, data obtained as evidence will necessarily be gathered for 
confirmability purposes; that is, those data can confirm pre-existing NTSs or refine them or 
place conditions on their application. The study in a GC will increase the probability that 
underpinning NTSs will hold true, except where the data are used to contest a NTS. Context in 
research design for GQR is important. NTSs arising from qualitative studies for generalisation 
may or may not be intended to be applied to alternative contexts. However, as we have seen 
from the examples listed in Error! Reference source not found. the contexts for NTSs may 
progressively diversify to different fields of study—consistent with Tsang (2014) cited 
earlier—different geographic locations and different groups of people. For example, the 
learnings from Projects 3 and 6 in the employment services context, were applied and refined 
in the remote training and education context (Projects 11 and 13). 
 
Processes of deduction, abduction, and induction 
 
Analytic techniques are also important for GQR studies. Earlier we noted in the 
example of Darwin’s theory of evolution that his analytical processes were both inductive and 
deductive—we described them as creative. Undoubtedly Darwin indulged in a great deal of 
retrospective validation; that is, using new information to confirm or deny a theory or 
conclusion already posited. Similarly, Newton and Linnaeus did not limit their analytic 
processes to deductive testing of hypotheses. Likewise, in many of our studies we used data 
inferentially and deductively. At times we used a combination of techniques, sometimes 
applying mixed methods approaches (Projects 2,3,5,7 and 11) for quantification, for 
triangulation or for synthesis—similar processes to those used in systematic reviews, and meta-
synthesis as discussed in the literature (Gough et al., 2017; Petticrew & Roberts, 2006; Wilder, 
2014). The point is, the NTSs that arise from this type analysis do not depend on a single 
analytic approach. We are not suggesting that there is less need for rigor, rather that rigorous 
methods can and maybe should apply different techniques depending on the data, context and 
research design. 
 
Testing NTSs in other contexts 
 
The research questions in GCs are also important. For example, the question “How does 
pre-existing theory X work in context Y?” is a question designed to test the validity or 
transferability (generalisability) of a NTS. This process is evident in each of the GCs in the 
community development stream. Evaluative research can also be used as GQR studies. While 
evaluations are often used more for the particular (program/policy/intervention), the evaluation 
question that formatively asks “How can successes or failures of programs A/B/C inform our 
understanding of policy D?” is a legitimate GQR question, which we have used well in the 
domestic violence policy and strategy examples (Projects 4 and 7) shown in Error! Reference 
source not found. and also represented in Error! Reference source not found.. 
 
Building a new old GC to answer previously unanswered questions 
 
A lot of qualitative research ends with more unanswered questions for future research. 
A new GC can add to the probability that NTSs established earlier are more likely to hold true, 
provided as noted above, the designed study is directed to that purpose. This was certainly the 
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case in the development of Project 13 from 11 and Project 6 from the findings of 3. In both 
cases the geographic spread of the study was extended from the Northern Territory In Australia 
to several Australian states, while retaining a focus on the study context in remote education 
and training and employment service provision respectively. 
 
Testing for truth 
 
We take the position that NTSs are propositions built on defensible foundations. Noting 
Patton’s (2015) analysis of truth in generalisation and Bridges’ (2017) definitions of truth 
propositions in research, we too argue that generalisation from research can result in normative 
statements on the same bases. NTSs are justified through consensus, correspondence, 
warrantability or coherence, depending on the nature of the evidence, the analytic process and 
the epistemological, ontological and cosmological positions taken. We argue further that the 
philosophical foundations of one NTS may be developed using different philosophical bases 
to create the next. This is indeed what happens with the combination of quantitative and 
qualitative methods where the ontological and epistemological positions differ, founded on 
paradigmatic assumptions often described in terms of post/positivism and constructivism. This 
was the case in Projects 3 and 5, where interview data was triangulated with quantitative data 
from secondary sources to generalise to NTSs. Perhaps more significantly it is evident also in 
the series of studies conducted in Indonesia (Projects 9, 10, 12) which drew on pre-existing 
cosmological assumptions of truth represented through religious symbols and structures and 
combined with more contemporary sociological understandings of truth represented through 
networks and social interactions. 
 
Implications and Conclusions 
 
The foregoing discussion has several implications for generalisability in qualitative 
research. Having established that a) the definitions of generalisation, based on quantitative 
research paradigms, are inadequate; and b) that generalisation is a process in research, as much 
or more than it is a product of research; and c) that generalisation is an iterative process; we 
can be confident that qualitative research plays a significant role in the production of 
generalisable epistemological truth—what we have described as Normative Truth Statements.  
Our first conclusion emerging from the historical and contemporary examples we have 
drawn on, is that generalisation from qualitative research is possible, and it is also a legitimate 
goal of a qualitative research endeavour. We no longer need to self-justify generalisation on 
the basis that “we can because we do.” Throughout history we see evidence of the process—a 
cycle of generalisation—of creating new knowledge iteratively, where truth statements are 
contested and confirmed drawing on evidence and theory. However, our understanding of 
generalisation is not an excuse for poor methodology. Nor should we be looking for 
generalisable truth to emerge from every piece of qualitative research. Truths emerging about 
the particular are often just as useful and used as those that lead to the general.  
Our reconceptualisation of generalisation also has implications for the use of qualitative 
research for informing policy. Our experience suggests that many policy advisors are reluctant 
to use qualitative research largely because of the self-deprecating limitations that qualitative 
researchers impose on their own work. What we can now say with confidence is that well-
designed qualitative research can be just as useful for generalisation as well-designed 
quantitative research. As we have shown with our research examples, the iterative nature of 
qualitative research lends itself well to theory development, and confirmation or rejection of 
normative truth statements—and the more this occurs, the greater the probability that those 
truth statements will hold generally, not just to the particular. 
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This leads us to another important conclusion about the design of qualitative research 
for generalisation purposes. Researchers must first be able to position themselves within a 
frame of existing statements of normative truth. Then from a theoretical and data gathering 
perspective, they must ask research questions that will respond to the existing knowledge base 
in ways that will clarify, challenge or confirm truth. In some cases, the new knowledge created 
may lead to a rejection of pre-existing assumptions of truth (as was the case with two of the 
GCs we cited from the field of remote education and training) and in others it may build upon 
and add to the existing truth statements (particularly in the series of community development 
GCs). Regardless, having positioned themselves in this way, researchers will be able to 
confidently make new statements of normative truth, and more so with each iteration of the 
generalisation cycle. 
Finally, and perhaps more importantly for practitioners and policy bureaucrats, the role 
that qualitative research plays in building normative truth about practice is fundamentally 
important. We argue that no amount of “counting” will make any difference to good 
professional practice in the contexts we have worked. Practitioners will inevitably be keen to 
learn how to work more effectively. This is perhaps why there is so much good qualitative 
research that draws on theory to give practical and generalised guidance to professionals and 
organisations.  
Having established generalisable principles or theories, qualitative researchers cannot 
rest on their laurels either. Contexts change, policy changes, technologies develop, public 
perceptions change and culture changes. Researchers need to continually take account of the 
changing policy and adult learning practice environments in their research, thereby revising 
their truth claims and theories. 
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